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Abstract
The study investigates whether atheism in B&H is treated, a priori, as amoralism and how this
affects plural civic space. If religion is privileged, is it a politically dictated value system or
pure ideology? Besides in-depth critical literature review, the author refers to a number of
structural interviews focusing on both groups (theists and agnostic atheists) as a direct indicator
of variability. The B&H Constitution obstructs the creation of a plural civic identity,
hypostasizes the collective political mentality, and stigmatizes atheism and agnosticism in
everyday life. Spiritual usurpation has moved into the realm of identity. The ideological
ethnonationalism has metastasized into a social organization's daily political discourse that
produces uncritical subjects in all three constitutive ethnic governments. Theism, for many in
the Balkans, has transformed from a sui generis sociocultural phenomenon into a sociopolitical
phenomenon. The loudest "defenders" of atheism are some believers who dissent from the three
national interest political model's status quo. The number of individual needs, and the real
impossibilities of their satisfaction, imply the necessary cooperation of the social community
members. A believer who questions the possibility of an atheist's universal validity as a moral
man denies the believers' chance of becoming a true believer.
Keywords: Agnosticism, atheism, theism, morality, plural civic space, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, former Yugoslavia, ethnopolitics, ethnoreligious ideology, stigma.

Introduction
This study investigates whether atheism and agnosticism in Bosnian society is treated,
a priori, as amoralism and how it affects plural civic space. If religion is privileged, then the
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question arises: is a religion here, in these conditions, a politically dictated value system, or is
it a pure ideology?
Ethnic, national, and confessional affiliation in the former Yugoslavia contribute to
political radicalization. Due to new national state theoretical inadequacy, (i.e., nationalism as
an ideology), religion is used as an instrument of socialization and legitimization of new
national-political state subjects.1Nationalist sentiments were systematically created, committed
to generating conditions in which the manifestation of ethnonationalism was the only desirable
public pattern of behavior. Paradoxically, during Communism, there was emphatic contempt
for people who went to a church or mosque and who celebrated religious holy days. The process
of an abnormal nationalization of religions in Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter B&H)
occurred in the 1980s and 1990s. The religious feelings and the far-right support resulted in a
fighting attitude against socialism and the development of political religion, or religious policy.
Being an atheist in traditional regions, such as the Balkans, has become quite
controversial after the fall of socialism. Among the European nations ruled by communist
regimes in the twentieth century, B&H is one of the most religious and at the same time one of
the least scientifically enlightened countries, according to research conducted by the non-profit,
non-partisan organization Pew Research Center. In B&H, 94% of the population believe in
God. It is in the top half of the most religious countries, led by Georgia with 99% and Armenia
with 95% of the population who believe in supernatural beings. 2 If we talk about national
intolerance, religious matrices are closely interconnected with the national exclusivity in the
former Yugoslavian countries; they complement each other. In addition to religious intolerance
between members of different faiths, religious intolerance towards atheists and the imposition
of religious postulates and ideas, such as attitudes towards abortion or gender ideology, are
increasingly pronounced in the Western Balkans by governing structures. It is required to
declare themselves atheists, but today it is just the opposite. It is desirable to be a believer
because it once was that a declared believer could not aspire to a higher position (because as a
believer, a person could not be a member of the communist party). Thus, today an atheist is
socially undesirable: "it is very likely that of the two unemployed women who applied for a
vacancy, a believer gets the job of cleaner, not one who is known in her midst as an

Faruk Hadžić, “The Politicization of Religion and the Sacralized Balkan Nations Regarding Bosnia and
Herzegovina,” Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe: Vol. 40: Iss. 7, Article 8, (2020):105,
https://digitalcommons.georgefox.edu/ree/vol40/iss7/8
2
https://www.pewforum.org/2017/05/10/religious-belief-and-national-belonging-in-central-and-eastern-europe/,
2017.
1
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infidel."3 However, a community should represent people's living framework—an "artificial"
environment that they have created in one space and act together at one time. To act together
means to satisfy life's needs and interests within a value system. Plural civic space draws its
meaning and sense as a concern for the "rest of value," which remains uncovered,
unrepresented, and inexhaustible in highly concentrated games of power. It is the one that
should maintain the public as a political field and does not leave it to the commercial, political
industry.
B&H ethnonational policies are policies of endangerment within vital national
interests.4 The protection of the national interest is something like a non-aggression pact, like
a social contract based on Hobbes' model: no one renounces their right to self-preservation but
renounces the right to interfere in and prevent others from self-preservation. However, unlike
Hobbes' theory, the place of the one who has the right to decide on behalf of all is vacant; to
protect their national interest, each group is a hostage to the others. As a national collective's
notion of its position, vulnerability closely corresponds to the antagonism that should be
understood in society as an inevitable fact, but in political terms it means the destruction of the
political. It implies the totalization of exclusivity, which abolishes politics as the art of
balancing between inclusion and exclusion, opening and closing, and which is only one of the
views of the notion of justice. Politics during the war of the 1990s was territorialized but
delocalized; today we have a similar pattern.
There is no coherent value system that would impose itself as general for the collective
members and be subject to preservation through legislation. The cessation of the threat
is the end of the collective, and members return to a natural state that now corresponds
to Rousseau's preoccupation with himself and indifference to other members of the
same collective, which leaves to the elites unlimited space to act in self-interest.5
Besides, three religious communities maintain the status quo or compete in clericalism, based
on Bosnian earthly patriotism, instead of being the foundation and bearers of plural civic unity.

3

Lino Veljak, http://www.glas-slavonije.hr/357463/11/Lino-Veljak-Nekad-se-od-nasih-karijerista-trazilo-da-seizjasnjavaju-kao-ateisti-a-danas-je-pozeljno-da-se-izjasnjavaju-kao-vjernici, 2018.
4
The Constitution defines Bosniak, Croat, and Serbs as a constituent people. In the B&H's ethnoreligious model,
which is formed by agreement of the three constituent peoples, the demographic remnant is unconstitutional. For
the most part, a mere constitutional decor appropriately enshrined in the last article of the Preamble of the
discriminatory B&H Constitution. Therefore, the term "Others" in the formulation of "hybrid" identities is an
unsentimental description of their position in this ethnoreligiously divided society. Faruk Hadžić, ”Social and
political exclusions within the post-Yugoslav ethnonational foundation in Bosnia and Herzegovina”
in Temida, Journal on victimization, gender and human rights, Vol 24, Issue 1, (2021):2, in process of publishing
5
Svjetlana Nedimović „Politička filozofija političkih elita u Bosni i Hercegovini: eksperiment iz prirodnog stanja“
[Political philosophy of political elites in Bosnia and Herzegovina: an experiment from the natural state] Okrugli
sto, vrijednosni odnos političkih elita u Bosni i Hercegovini, prema Bosni i Hercegovini i Evropskoj uniji,
(Sarajevo: Institut za društvena istraživanja Fakulteta političkih nauka Univerziteta u Sarajevu, 2009), 149.
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The significance of mentioning Serbia and Croatia in this study is directly related to
B&H and its Constitution, which defines Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks), Bosnian Croats, and
Bosnian Serbs as constituent peoples. Historian Hrvoje Klasić believes that in Croatia and
Serbia, it is difficult to distinguish politics (i.e., national from religious); and that the Croatian
Catholic Church is more Croatian than Catholic, just as the Serbian Orthodox Church is more
Serbian than Orthodox. 6 Hence, one may conclude that Croatia is a country of extremely
religious people. Statistics show that as many as 86% of the population declare themselves
Catholics, 4.5% Orthodox and 1.5% Muslims, while only 3.81% declare themselves atheists.7
One Croatian study's findings indicate that members of non-religious and atheistic
organizations perceive their position as stigmatized, and that they use various management
techniques (passing, covering, selective, and voluntarily disclosure) to navigate through dayto-day life. The feeling of stigmatization and discrimination arises from the ubiquity of religion
in the public space and the politicization of (non-)religiosity issues.8
This author maintains that atheism as a mass phenomenon is not a phenomenon of more
recent, post-statist times, or as an individual and marginal phenomenon like today; it has always
existed in communism in this region. If atheism originally arose out of disappointment in the
faith and the ecclesiastic institution, theism in its modern form followed out of restrictions and
disappointment in atheism and atheistic institutions in socialism. However, the way of
transition from atheism to theism in this region is complex and debatable. Ivan Cvitković, a
sociologist of religion, realized that after analyzing the role of religion in the war, that the issue
was based on the shift from "vulgar atheism to vulgar theism." “Vulgar theism" in B&H,
represents the absence of any sense of the need and values of the Other. It means that the Other
is only rarely regarded as Ours, as mine, as if the other has no authentic life and is
acknowledged only as He or She, as absence, and never as You, as a presence. Moreover, this
is "a specific form of violence against people."9
The presupposition of atheism, in general, speaks of human freedom in social aspects.
In the age of the enlightenment, it was considered whether an atheist society was possible,

Hrvoje Klasić, “Socijalistički Sisak i Katolička crkva” [Socialist Sisak and Catholic Church], Antiquam
Fidem- radovi sa znanstvenog skupa, (2011):383-397
7
Pew Research Center, https://www.pewforum.org/2017/05/10/religious-belief-and-national-belonging-incentral-and-eastern-europe/ ,2017.
8
Nikolina Bajić Hazdovac, “Representation of Non-Religious and Atheistic Identities in a Highly Religious
Society - Croatian Case," Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe: Vol. 40 : Iss. 1 , (2020):1
https://digitalcommons.georgefox.edu/ree/vol40/iss1/6
9
"The Contribution of Academician Ivan Cvitković to the Development of Sociology of Religion (on the occasion
of his 75th anniversary) ", Akademija Nauka i Umjetnosti Bosne i Hercegovine [Academy of sciences and arts of
Bosnia and Herzegovina,] Volume 13, (2020):194.
6
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emphasizing the question of its degree of morality. So, it was not a question of whether such a
society could exist but how it would look. In such a society, there are no religious institutions
that subordinate man so that a person, free from God and the Church, freely organizes their life
in the most appropriate way. For Marx, religion was a private matter for those who believed,
which implies that it is a private issue and a question of freedom whether one will believe or
not. The assumption is that everyone can have their own religion, which means there would be
as many religions as there are people. Branko Bošnjak believes that, due to this, there would
"follow a necessary turn so that in the spirit of religious institutions it would not be accepted.
The legal notion of the private would mean that society has risen above it and does not want
itself subordinated to the content of some eschatological belief." And further: "It could be said
in general, depending on what kind of man one is, such is also the truth."10 The only and true
meaning of atheism (according to Marx) is the struggle for human freedom. The author argues
that religion has no monopoly on morality. Morality has no limiting aspect in practice and can
be secular, which does not mean that it cannot be religious.
Can a person who does not believe in God and is not committed to any religion be a
moral person? Why is it currently so disputable to be an atheist in the Balkans? Many data
confirm that religiosity does not affect a person's moral profile, although, according to Paul
Mojzes, the Judeo-Christian and Islamic religions show a profound requirement for a genuinely
religious person to be moral or ethical. However, many war criminals, organizers of
concentration camps, or post-Yugoslav capitalistic actors converted to religion in the process
of illegitimate privatization in the 1990s.11 12 The same matrix is related to those labeled as war
heroes, as often characterized during the former Yugoslav wars, or examples of those who
display sacrifice and philanthropy. I maintain that there is little to no evidence that declared
belief or declared atheism affects whether one will be moral, humane, or inhumane.
In many religions, the "sowing of doubt" is a mortal sin (except in liberal
Protestantism, doubt is seen as a positive characteristic.)13 Those who doubt God become
suspicious and spread it to others. Moreover, within the political sphere or with maintaining
political power, it could be menacing to show understanding for nonbelievers, which may
arouse some believers' wrath.
Branko Bosnjak, Filozofija i kršćanstvo: racionalna kritika iracionalnog shvaćanja [Philosophy and
Christianity: A Rational Critique of Irrational Understanding], (Zagreb: Stvarnost, 1987), 421.
11
Faruk Hadžić, “Post-Yugoslav spaces between defective democracies, authoritarianism, and
kleptocracies,” International Affairs and Global Strategy, vol. 86, (2020).
12
Jovan Teokarević, Democratization of the Balkan Postcommunist Political Systems, State and Democracy,
(Beograd: Službeni glasnik i Fakultet političkih nauka).
13
E.g., Paul Tillich's Dynamics of Faith.
10
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Method
This study included an in-depth scientific review of professional literature within the
analytical and critical analysis methods. As a direct indicator of variability in real conditions,
the author refers to qualitative research by in-depth structural interviews. The author focused
on both groups (theists and atheists). The narrators participated alone, not within the group
settings. The study included published interviews with four declared atheists and five
additional participants, three females and two males, from ages 35 to 56. Four were practicing
Muslims, and one was a non-practicing cultural Muslim.

1. Agnosticism and Atheism as Paradigms of Amorality
Currently in the Balkans, one must be a part of one of three ethnoreligious collectivities
for societal acceptance, regardless of one's moral background. First, let us observe the term
"individual" within the B&H community. The plural civic space is a central feature of a
democratic society because it allows citizens to be an active part of the political sphere beyond
elections. It should encourage governments to be transparent and accountable and highlight the
limited freedoms and factors that contribute to social exclusion: discriminatory practices,
unequal power relations, and institutional barriers that prevent access to public services and
political participation. Politics of inclusion may imply the need to change the social
"motherland," not just the expectation that marginalized groups must adapt.14 The development
of a democratic society's institutions is considered a necessary precondition for freedom of
human development and citizens' active participation in political life through a critical channel
of influence on its free development. The lack of supranational and nonparty-based civic
movements (gathered around the universal values of human and civil rights) negatively affects
the resistance of those who do not share the ethnoreligious idea matrix that the government's
ideological-interest in manipulation is in B&H. 15 The independent critical statements are
associated with personal risks of being declared an internal enemy of the particular ethnic
community. Then it is no longer a set of independent, thinking, and mature individuals, but

Faruk Hadžić, “Social and political exclusions within the post-Yugoslav ethnonational foundation in Bosnia
and Herzegovina,” Temida, Journal on victimization, gender and human rights,2021-No 1,(2021):2, in process of
publishing
15
Faruk Hadžić, “Bosnia between the Dayton's peace straight jacket, development, and power centers' moral
obligation; solicitation to Biden,” Small Wars Journal, (2020):2
14
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uninformed communities—collectives that do not allow themselves the internal dynamics of
life, which includes healthy conflicts.16
The theologian, Drago Bojić,17 believes:
That in this society, which has been clericalized to the maximum, we should give as
much space as possible in the journal, Svjetlo riječi [Light of the Word] 18 to people who
do not practice the Faith, who do not declare themselves as believers. It seems it is
harder for those who do not 'count' as believers than in the previous system for those
who practiced their Faith.19
So, Bojić further and ‘blasphemously’ states that the existing vulgar theism is worse than the
vulgar atheism in the former Yugoslavia. Another Franciscan, Fr. Mile Babić, claimed that "the
position of atheists today is approximately the same as that of theists in the former socialist
system," and that "in a democratic state, members of all religions and worldviews, and that
means both atheists and theists,

must be equal before the state, state institutions, and

laws."20 Babić further, in the manner of spiritual pluralism and sufficient religious tolerance
that does not characterize members of dominant religious figures in a position of power in
B&H, says the following about atheists: "Despite the pressure of the majority, they remain
faithful to their atheistic worldview. Their atheism is a credible attitude because they see that
every day those who consider themselves believers do not live by their Faith; some even live
as enemies of their Faith. Faith is an act of a person, not a collective."21 This attitude and moral
uplift of atheistic credibility imposes itself as a total subversion in a society in which atheists
are considered less moral because they do not have to be such, since they are not afraid of
God's punishment.
It is my view that atheists are discriminated against by the very structure of B&H (since
it is religiously equated with ethnonationalism), and B&H is very far from being a secular
state.22 Those who do not belong to one of the three religious groups, or who do not want to
show affiliation, are considered a foreign element; they cannot elect representatives and are

Drago Bojić, https://www.tacno.net/sarajevo/drago-bojic-danas-je-teze-biti-ateist-nego-vjernik/ 2014.
Until recently a professor at the Franciscan School of Theology in Sarajevo, director of IMIC (International
Multireligious and Intercultural Center) known to the general public as the former editor of Svjetlo riječi (Light
of the World) who was fired because his editorial policy did not suit the authorities.
18
Light of the World is a Franciscan journal.
19
Drago Bojić, https://www.tacno.net/sarajevo/drago-bojic-danas-je-teze-biti-ateist-nego-vjernik/ 2014.
20
Alen Mujkanović, http://www.prometej.ba/clanak/copy-paste/ateizam-u-bosni-i-hercegovini-552, 2012.
21
Ibid.
22
Presidents do not swear each on their holy book, but for example, the former Bosnian Grand Mufti founded the
political party and ran in the presidential election. These two segments seem totally unrelated. A mufti or
clergyman should be able to run in a secular state, regardless of how the oath is sworn.
16
17
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barred from running for office at any state level.23 Moreover, insisting on the religious form
and its "civic manifestation," supporting creativity in the form of proverbial multiculturalism
and diversity, celebrating religious holidays in a specific local color, offering religious
greetings from parliamentary rostrums, postage stamps, and the most often practiced absence
from work during Friday prayers have become "normal" so that no one objects.
Examples of vulgar theism are innumerable. A cursory search of the portals in B&H
leads to the following texts: “Aggressive atheism attacks;”24 “Theory of evolution: science or
hoax?”25 “Why is atheism essentially illogical?”26 and “The evolutionary burqa of atheism.”27
Furthermore, if someone refers to some illogical and inhumane procedure in, for example the
Islamic communities, that person is automatically declared an Islamophobe or an aggressive
atheist. Atheists are often equated with LGBTQIA+ minorities. Simultaneously, the survival
of an "atheistic scene" in B&H is lacking. Moreover, some citizens equate atheists with
communists, some even see them as a sect, and some believe that atheists hate believers. When
interpreting the census results in B&H, devastating data on the rate of education and the number
of illiterates were almost ignored, focusing on national and religious affiliation. In the census
itself, along with the options to declare themselves as members of the three major religions,
residents could also choose to be registered as atheists, agnostics, or not to declare themselves
on this issue at all. Thus, the results showed visible persons who are considered non-religious
or less religious, and persons who deviated from national policies that national and religious
affiliation are closely linked to, i.e., meaning that belonging to a nation necessarily determines
religious affiliation.
The basis of this kind of hypocritical, moral judgment and object paradigm can be
pointed out through the International Criminal Tribunal data for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
in Hague, Netherlands. One hundred percent of their accused declared themselves as believers,
not a single atheist. Chetniks, Ustashas, and the paramilitary divisions committed crimes solely
by religious and national motivations. In contrast, during World War II, partisan crimes were
political and far less intense. Moreover, the day before the liberation of Sarajevo in 1945, the

Faruk Hadžić, “Social and political exclusions within the post-Yugoslav ethnonational foundation in Bosnia
and Herzegovina”, Temida, Journal on victimization, gender and human rights, Vol 24, Issue 1, (2021):2, in
process of publishing.
24
http://www.islambosna.ba/agresivni-ateizam-napada/, 2011.
25
http://bosnjaci.net/prilog.php?pid=50055, 2011.
26
http://www.bosnjaci.net/prilog.php?pid=46074, 2012.
27
http://bosnjaci.net/prilog.php?pid=50055, 2013.
23
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Ustashas took dozens of prisoners (arrested because they were Serbs), and executed them.28
After that, the Bleiburg massacres happened.29 The Bleiburg monument reads, "dedicated to
innocent Croatian soldiers." However, many hardened Croatian war criminals lie there with
the possibility that some innocent soldiers and civilians were among them.
Whether religious people are morally better than nonbelievers could be resolved by
answering the question: are evil, violence, and inhumanity more visible in our times of growing
theoretical agnosticism and practical indifference than in the centuries of unity between state
and church? Thus, morality's question could only be resolved practically and not by doctrinal
discussions of faith and agnosticism.30 The particular norms by which moral actions are judged
vary to some extent from individual to individual and from culture to culture (although some
norms, such as do not to kill, do not to steal, and honor one’s parents, are widespread).
However, value judgments concerning human behavior are passed in all cultures, regardless of
religious or non-religious affiliation.
With the public emphasis on non-religiousness and declaring oneself an atheist, life
outside the framework of religion often caused unpleasant situations to Adi Smajlagić (27)
from Maglaj (a town in B&H, Federation of B&H entity) and Igor Jokić (25) from Prijedor (a
town in B&H, Republic of Srpska entity). While Igor's family was not overburdened with his
religious beliefs, Adi's family found it difficult to accept his views. Both of them encountered
criticism and negative comments from friends and acquaintances, and it was the wrong attitude
of people who consider themselves believers that conditioned their attitudes about personal
atheism. According to them, atheism in B&H is still a taboo topic.
People are convinced that religious faith is the source of morality and that someone
who is not afraid of eternal punishment cannot be moral. Adi gives a picture of the society in
which he lives as follows: “A few days ago, a colleague commented on the current government
in Maglaj, believing that the left-wing party in power in the municipality cannot make the right
decisions because most of them do not believe in God. Of course, because of such an attitude,
which many believers probably shared here, I feel uncomfortable, marginalized," points out
Adi. "I do not think there is marginalization concerning the majority, but there may be
difficulties or at least some pressure from people who are right-wing and closely link national
Slavko Dadić, Posljednji Dani okupatorske tiranije u Sarajevu, Sarajevo u revoluciji, IV, [The Last Days of the
Occupying Tyranny in Sarajevo, Sarajevo in the Revolution], (Sarajevo: Istorijski arhiv Sarajevo, 1977), 181195.
29
Bleiburg is a town in Austria near the border with Yugoslavia known for a war crime at the end of World War
II when Tito's partisans committed mass murders over captured soldiers of defeated armies and civilians who
accompanied them in an attempt to surrender to the Western Allies.
30
Lino Veljak, “Agnosticizam i vjerski indiferentizam,” Diacovensia:teološki prilozi, 21, 2, (2013): 237-249.
28
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and religious identity," said Igor. He points out that “today many people, whether believers or
not, criticize society's non-secular nature and the religious community, towards which a large
part of the funds from public budgets is directed.”31
Fedja Stukan, an actor from Sarajevo has been declaring himself an atheist for years.
He answers the question of whether he and like-minded people face prejudice:
A considerable mass of people here have not even met someone of another nationality,
let alone met an atheist. Religious officials are most responsible for this because they
spread hatred towards all minorities, including atheists. It has been going on for
thousands of years, but in the last 20 years, we have only two or three from various
religions that advocate reconciliation, tolerance, peace, breaking down prejudices
against any minority. We are also rich with those four who propagate it.
When asked if he have an ugly experience because of all these, Fedja Štukan halfjokingly answers:
Apart from one thousand death threats, rape, and slaughter of my daughter, I did not
have any significant problems. I received my first threats when I was doing trials
against the war in Iraq. They spoke as you have as an atheist doing trials against the
killing of Muslims in the world. Later it went through a peace installation when I was
placed on a statue of Jesus Christ because I received many Catholic believers' threats.
Then it went after a multi-religious adult film. I made a petition against the award to
Bosnian Muslim Grand Mufti Mustafa Ceric, which he did not deserve in any case.
That is why I received over 500-600 threats. I cannot say that I had big problems
because of that. A few days after the petition I wrote, I got a permanent job. I cannot
say that my atheism is to blame for something that is happening to me.32
Due to his beliefs, the young journalist Mirza Ajnadžić was called "Antichrist" in one
discussion. Mirza also likes to defend himself from this kind of prejudice, he says, with a laugh:
"It is even funnier to me on the one hand and very interesting on the other because I like to
argue. I think it is very healthy to argue; the only thing that matters is how someone makes the
arguments—are they funny, or can we talk about those arguments?”33

Prejudice against

atheists and agnostics can be viewed analogously from the perspective of believers' position in
the age of socialism. Thus, we can observe this as the verification paradigm of 40 years of
prejudice against theists in this region. With the collapse of that system, the sanctity of faith
and nation has been inaugurated, especially these three constituent peoples, where one ethnicity
concurrently implies faith.

Dalibor Kraišniković, https://zamisli.ba/zivjeti-kao-ateista-u-nesekularnoj-bih/, 2017.
Marija
Arnautović,
https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/ateisti-na-marginama-drustvenogzivota/24943063.html, 2013.
33
Ibid
31
32
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Given that the Balkans is permeated by nationalism that has nothing to do with religion
but is closely tied because of ignorant people, atheists may be un-affirmed by some
segments of society. Thus, for example, when applying for a job and related to highlevel corruption, people who are not members of a religious institution may have fewer
rights or are known to be classified as "other" citizens. In the West, in countries that are
more religiously oriented, this may also be because the church plays a significant role
in society. People who are not members of the same Faith may accept believers of
another faith more easily than atheists per se. Such a thing can be related to a
phenomenon based on the similarity of people, i. e., people prefer people who are
similar to themselves and their lifestyle, and religion is part of their lifestyle (A.B., 35,
female, a post-doc research fellow, from Zenica, B&H, currently working in
Switzerland, non-practicing Muslim).
"Society is nationalistic. Moreover, atheists are less valuable in this society. Furthermore, a
priori they are deprived of every opportunity for social affirmation and perspective in this
incoherent society. For employment and other things, society wants to animate them in every
way" (B.A, male, 45, a lawyer from Zenica, B&H, practicing Muslim).
I completely agree with the thesis. In our 'secular' state, where religion permeates every
part of society, being an infidel is not easy. Primarily, ethnicity is so closely connected
with religion in our country, so if you are not a believer, you automatically fall out of
one of the three Torahs [religions]. Unfortunately, it is also true for morality because
we do not believe in the inner human moral compass, but the threat of hell/aspiration
to heaven. There has been a higher percentage of atheists in Norway for the last few
years than theists, but they are more moral and polite, as can be seen by the society and
social order which is a model for many. We are the black hole of Europe, but it does
not matter; we must be all great believers, mashallah!” (E.K., female, 35, an English
language teacher, from Zenica, B&H, currently living in Norway, practicing Muslim).
In the ethnopolitical framework, the ethnic, interrelated with the religious, is perceived
as primary. It is how ethnicism, ethnocentrism, ethnonationalism, ideological, and political
matrices of defining life in the B&H social community are created. However, civic unity, or
mutual human solidarity, is based on organic elements "from below" through existentialinterest connections within the civic value framework. Religious-national kitsch is no longer
the primary belief, nor the genuine religious need for God, but experience, publicity, and
manifestation. It has now become a kind of fashion.34 Thus, the result is that ethics and morality
are questioned. Moreover, atheists' position in B&H is in many ways similar to the nonconstitutive category of “Others.” Thus, the Dayton Constitution shaped ethnic-religious
exclusivism and an unconstitutional "hybrid" identity.

Besim Spahić, https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/ateisti-na-marginama-drustvenog-zivota/24943063.html,
2013.
34

OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (MARCH 2021) XLI, 2

79

2. Agnosticism and Atheism as an Anti-ideological Sociopolitical Paradigm
When one hears an ethnic nationalist ardently defending their views and beliefs, and at
the same time, fiercely exaggerate in every way; whether they glorify their own or degrade
others, one of many questions arises. Do they do so out of personal motives because their
personality dictates that they speak so and behave accordingly, or do they express ethnicnationalist

views

under

the

pressure

of

certain

external

circumstances?

Dejan Kecmanović notes that "the appropriate external circumstances, the exceptional
personal inclinations of individuals towards ethnonationalism similar to the behavioral pattern,
and the group mentality that is not foreign to any man, ethnonationalism is marked by specific
myths, collective memories, value systems, and traditions."35 Moreover, within the Dayton
Peace Accords and its Constitution, at any point in any political process in B&H institutions
concerning any issue or problem, politics can face a wall of "vital national interest" as absolute
inviolability, taboos, holy place, which paralyzes politics and deprives it of meaning and
purpose.36 This mechanism of Dayton's irrational "defense," as a rationalized derivative of its
initial denial, is called reactive formation in psychology. Phenomenologically and
psychoanalytically, more precisely, the reactive formation is a unique, specific form of
repression. As there is also the phenomenon of reactive formation on reactive formation, this
one formation disguise gives rise to others.37
In political life, ethnocracy replaces democracy, special ethnopolitical totalitarianism
replaces national (state) political orientation; and ethnopolitics, biopolitics, and populism grow
unstoppably against democratic politics. The most important feature of this approach is
undoubtedly creating a discourse of "naturalness," supported by different, mostly pseudoscientific, or mythopoetic narratives of a particular nation. The goal of naturalness discourse is
to devalue alternative discursive patterns as "utopian" or "abnormal." It is a kind of naturalistic
delusion of the dominant ethnopolitical discourse.”38
Two narrators, Sefika (56) (a Bosnian literature teacher from Ključ, B&H), and
Nathaniel (39) (a lifeguard from Sarajevo, B&H), born as Christian Orthodox, currently living
in Norway expressed their point of view in the following way:

Dejan Kecmanović, Etnička vremena [Ethnic times], (Beograd: Biblioteka XX vek, 2001), 65.
Faruk Hadžić, “Bosnia between the Dayton's peace straight jacket, development, and power centers' moral
obligation; solicitation to Biden”, Small Wars Journal, (2020):2
37
Esad Bajtal, Psihosocijalni kontekst političkih elita u BiH [Psychosocial context political elites in BiH]. Okrugli
sto, vrijednosni odnos političkih elita u Bosni i Hercegovini ,prema Bosni i Hercegovini i Evropskoj
uniji,(Sarajevo: Institut za društvena istraživanja Fakulteta političkih nauka Univerziteta u Sarajevu, 2009),136.
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Faruk Hadžić, „The political psychology of extremism; "naturalness" of the phenomenon in the Western
Balkans," Technium Social Sciences Journal, vol. 11(1), (2020):257.
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Radical changes took place in the Western Balkans countries in the early 1990s: the
disintegration of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the formation of nationstates, and the struggle for affirmation. As religious values were neglected in the
socialist system, religious centers became national centers in the Balkans. Religion
creeps into all pores of society, and a strange relationship is created towards it, which
is ideologically charged. Yes, I believe that there is a sign of equality between religion
and ideology in the countries of the Western Balkans (S.K., female, 56, Practitioner
Muslim).
Of course, religion is a kind of politically dictated system. Bošnjani-Bosniaks39 existed
before Islam arrived in our area, such as the most famous Bosnian church. However,
today Bosniak is a synonym for a Muslim, and in my opinion, it destroys our state and
identity. I am a Muslim, but I distance myself from ‘Bosniakism’ because Bosniaks
should be all people regardless of religion, at least that was the case before (N.S., male,
39, Practitioner Muslim born as Orthodox, currently living in Norway).
Thus, socialist ideological collectivism was replaced by the mass ethnic-clerical loyalty
in which, again, there is no place for the individual, that is, for citizens with their human desires
and rights. Multinational, and grounded citizens (gathered around the universal values of
human and civil rights), such as atheists, have no place within the government's ideological
political ideology.
According to Esad Bajtal, it is like every ethnic prejudice to "glorify one's own" or
"degrade others," i.e., to do both simultaneously. Instead of arguments and reason, the narrator
refers to mythology, tradition, or some other a priori pattern of (re-)evaluation of others.
Furthermore, all this would not be disputable if, without coming to the level of practical life
relations, it remained in the sphere of verbal exchanges. 40 However, humankind's bloody
history draws its inhumane trace precisely from racial, ethnic, religious, and other prejudices
(greed, selfishness, jealousy, arrogance, and many other moral evils), a regular inventory item
of all human communities from the ancient times to the present day.
Deliberately and politically targeted, there is an abuse of faith for nefarious purposes.
In the name of the faith thus understood, measured not by the "heavenly" but by today's political
clerical standards, we are witnessing the stigmatization and discrimination of atheists and
agnostics.

39

The archaic name originating from the Middle Ages, for inhabitants of Bosnia.
Esad Bajtal, “Pacifikacijski potencijali civilnog društva” [Pacification potentials of civil society], Zbornik
Orbis, (2006):1.
40
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Conclusion
In regard to the question of theism or atheism, freedom must mean the possibility for
everyone to think in their own way, take (or not take) a particular position, and make
judgments. The essence of an open and liberal society should be that every idea can be critically
discussed, resulting in the individual's right to property and dignity, and other rights. All
collectives need to allow for differences among themselves and allow for a dialogue of
opinions. Everything else leads to unanimity, depersonalization of people.
When states begin defining citizens primarily by their belonging to an ethnic or
religious group, discrimination and stigmatization are immediately apparent. In a democracy,
members of all religions and worldviews, including atheists and theists, must be equal before
state institutions and laws. The ideological ethnonationalism has metastasized into a social
organization's daily political discourse that produces uncritical subjects to B&H’s three
constitutive ethnic governments. It imposes an exclusive definition of the ethnoreligious
collective as the only appropriate form of sociopolitical organization. Theism in the ideological
form, transformed from a sui generis socio-cultural phenomenon into a sociopolitical
phenomenon. Spiritual usurpation has moved into the realm of identity.
When one religion stands out as unique, then its members gain advantages inaccessible
to others, starting with education, employment, and social prejudices against the religious or
non-religious Other, in this case, atheists and agnostics. Prejudice gains momentum. Yet it is
necessary to hear the voice of the Other, especially if it is the voice of those who suffer. The
state should be secular, neither religious nor atheistic. There should be neither a state church,
a mosque, nor should there be state atheism. However, in this system of relations, the state
must establish an equal attitude towards all, regardless of what their attitude is toward religion
or atheism. The B&H Constitution obstructs creating a plural civic identity and hypostasizes
the collective political mentality. Vulgarism and atheistic stigma became an integral part of
everyday life. In a nationally and religiously divided society, such as B&H, the exclusion of
those who are different is socio-politically conditioned, so it is not surprising that atheists are
viewed within this matrix. Therefore, it is necessary to expose all the internationally imposed
concepts, which result in the systematic destruction and denial of Bosnia's national identity and
state.
I maintain that a believer who questions the possibility of an atheist's universal validity
as a moral man avoids the believers' chance of becoming a true believer. It is a devastating fact
that spiritual usurpation passed into the realm of identity prevailing in B&H today. The
fundamental issue is that the loudest atheist "defenders" are some believers who do not absorb
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themselves into the three national interest political model's advocacy power-sharing and
maintaining status quo, nor agreeing to their participation in this form of sociopolitical
representation.
The number of individual needs, and the real impossibilities of their satisfaction, imply
the necessary cooperation of the social community members. This willing consent to
communion should be manifested in the experimental paradigm of life as solidarity, consent,
and cooperation—in short, a crystallized awareness of the needs for joint action.
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